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Abstract 
According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Demand Response (DR) is defined 
as: “Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption patterns 
in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed 
to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when system 
reliability is jeopardized.” In the US, experience with regional electricity markets suggests that 
active DR is crucial to both power system reliability and market efficiency. Accordingly, 
efforts to enable demand-side participation in the US are providing significant opportunities 
for end-customers, load serving entities, and independent system operators. In New Zealand, a 
number of DR initiatives exist or are coming online. Given the importance of DR initiatives 
and systems to enable participation in the demand side of the market, the purpose of this paper 
is to provide a detailed understanding of the various systems already installed, and potentially 
required, to implement DR in New Zealand.  
Types of DR considered include interruptible load, Transpower’s demand response initiatives, 
demand side bidding and forecasting, dispatchable demand, and ripple control.  This paper also 
reviews which groups of market participants are using DR, and for what purpose. 
Currently, most DR is incentive based, but the deployment of smart meters at consumers’ 
premises may lead to significant adoption of price based DR, such as initiatives to introduce 
time of use and peak pricing to domestic users. Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) 
have been defined as any product or service that monitors, controls, or analyzes energy in the 
home, and may be utility or non-utility based. HEMS and the initiatives mentioned form a 
rapidly emerging fabric of DR systems in NZ. 




According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Demand Response (DR) is defined 
as: “Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption patterns 
in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed 
to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when system 
reliability is jeopardized [1].” In the US, experience with regional electricity markets suggests 
that active DR is crucial to both power system reliability and market efficiency [2]. 
Accordingly, efforts to enable demand-side participation in the US are providing significant 
opportunities for end-customers, load serving entities, and independent system operators [2]. 
In New Zealand, a number of DR initiatives exist or are coming online. Given the importance 
of DR initiatives and systems to enable participation in the demand side of the market, the 
purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed understanding of the various systems already 
installed, and potentially required, to implement DR in New Zealand. This paper also reviews 
which groups of market participants are using DR, and for what purpose. Figure 1 illustrates 
the monetary values and speed of response timescales of various forms of DR in NZ. 
 
Figure 1 Annual value and speed of response timescales of various forms of DR in NZ. Arrow 
headed lines denote call time only. IL values correspond to cleared quantities for 2009 and 
2010 obtained from Electricity Authority data. USI and UNI DSI values are total call and 
availability payments made for 2013. Wholesale and all end user values are for 2011 [3]. 
2. DR at the National Grid Level 
2.1 Nodal Pricing 
Nodal Pricing in half hourly spot price trading periods is a DR mechanism that operates, to 
some extent, in the wholesale market. On the supply side, the system relies upon competition 
amongst generators to moderate prices. On the demand side, purchasers are currently neither 
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dispatched nor receive constrained on or off payments. They observe the final price for the 
volume they use.  Consequently they have an incentive to reduce the nodel spot price if and 
when they can.  Some larger purchasers, and possibly retailers, are known to practice this. 
However it is ineffective for small to medium consumers, who may not be exposed to the spot 
price, and have very little load to shift.  Even for large purchasers, the signals are very much 
dependent on the accuracy of prices in the schedules, which are in turn dependent on inputs 
such as generator offers, non-conforming load bids, and the System Operator’s (SO’s) load 
forecast. 
2.2 Demand Side Bidding & Forecasting (DSBF) 
This Electricity Authority initiative aims to improve the inputs into the price forecast schedules 
in order to improve the accuracy of the schedules themselves. This in turn allows better use of 
generation and DR capability [4]. New features to the nodal pricing scheme were implemented 
with the introduction of DSBF [5]. While load at conforming Grid Exit Points1 (GXPs) 
continues to be accurately forecast centrally by the SO, under DSBF, purchasers at conforming 
GXPs can voluntarily bid price responsive (i.e. elastic) demand as difference bids. Purchasers 
at non-conforming GXPs prepare nominated bids as previously required. The SO uses this 
information to publish two schedules called the Price-Responsive Schedule (PRS) and the Non-
Response Schedule (NRS). The NRS assumes no demand (i.e. inelastic) response to price. For 
conforming GXPs, the PRS assumes demand or elastic response to price by including the 
difference bids [6]. Comparing the two schedules provides information about how price-
responsive bids affect the schedules. The schedules are published every half hour covering a 
rolling 36 hour period. The communication mechanism is the Wholesale Information & 
Trading System (WITS) [7]. 
2.3 Dispatchable Demand (DD) 
This Electricity Authority initiative is under development and is expected to be operational in 
May 2014 [8] [9]. It is incentive based DR that will operate in the wholesale market. It is the 
demand side complement to the supply of dispatchable generation. It will allow large end-users 
to be dispatched in half hour trading periods in a demand side manner equivalent to generators. 
Constrained on/off payments2 will apply as they do for generators. Nominated bids must be 
submitted for every trading period. Thus it will be possible for nominated bids to be submitted 
at conforming GXPs by DD purchasers. At any GXP, the purchaser can determine whether a 
nominated bid is of dispatch or non-dispatch type, whereby the latter bid type turns dispatch 
off. All nominated dispatch and non-dispatch bids will go into the PRS. All nominated dispatch 
bids go into the NRS. DD bids are subject to the same 2-hour gate closure provisions of the 
Code as non-DD bids and generator offers. Participation requires a Dispatch Capable Load 
Station (DCLS). The communication mechanism is the SO’s dispatch tools and WITS [7]. 
DCLS requirements for a metering installation and to be a dispatchable load purchaser will 
need to be met [10]. However, potential DD purchasers at non-conforming GXPs are already 
required to submit bids for every trading period and so there would be little, if any, extra 
compliance for them under DD. At conforming GXPs this will be a new requirement. It is 
                                                     
1 A conforming GXP is one whose load can be accurately forecast by a central forecaster, 
whereas the load at a non-conforming GXP cannot. 
 
2 Constrained-on payments compensate a purchaser for being required to purchase electricity 
at a price above the level its bid indicated it was willing to pay. Constrained-off payments 
compensate a purchaser for being curtailed when final prices do not justify that curtailment.  
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possible under DD to aggregate a number of loads into a single DCLS, as long as the aggregated 
loads are from the same GXP. 
2.4 Demand Response Initiatives 
For the national grid, the regulatory environment requires Transpower to first seek non-
transmission solutions when considering major capital projects, in order for example, to defer 
building new transmission assets [11]. Transpower has used DR since the 1990’s to defer 
transmission investment [12]. This Transpower grid owner incentive based initiative began as 
the Upper South Island (USI) DR trial and was followed by the Upper North Island Demand 
Side Initiative (UNI DSI). It operates out of market. Users who have discretionary demand may 
participate by reducing their usage when called upon to do so, and receive a call payment for 
their reduction [13]. Two types are available, the first being Security DR whereby the user is 
compelled to reduce consumption by a contracted amount when called upon to do so. An 
availability payment is also made. The second type is Economic or Price Responsive DR in 
which the user may voluntarily opt in to a call. For both types the call from Transpower is made 
at least 2.5 hours in advance. Communication is managed via the Demand Response 
Management System (DRMS) between Transpower and the Curtailment Service Provider 
(CSP) using Alstom’s DRBizNet platform. The CSP may be the consumer or a third party 
providing service on the consumer’s behalf. A Time of Use or Smart Meter is required to log 
electricity use (e.g. half hourly). Communication via the DRMS to the CSP is by internet via 
Email or web-browser. Automated web-based computer-to-computer communication is also 
available. 
 
Figure 2 Transpower DR call price history [Source: Transpower NZ Ltd]. 
In July 2013 Transpower announced that it had received a very positive response [14]. 
Suppliers varied from commercial businesses, to larger industrials, and to retailers. Over 200 
MW was finally obtained representing about 8% of Upper North Island peak demand.  Figure 
2 shows how the cost of Transpower’s DR has fallen substantially. The Price Responsive DR 
has proven to be the most favourable type in terms of both cost and availability. One third party 
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In November 2013 the Commerce Commission approved expanding Transpower’s DR 
programme geographically beyond the UNI DSI to the whole of country to enable it to be tested 
throughout New Zealand [15]. Transpower ultimately has a target of obtaining 10% of peak 
national demand (6500 MW) through DR [16]. In light of the UNI success, this target appears 
to be realistic. The next target is small to medium size businesses offering 20 to 200 kW of 
DR. In the future this may eventually be extended to households, as the DRBizNet platform 
has this capability. This could occur through the introduction of smart appliances such as 
fridges, freezers, and thermostats which might link to a smart meter communicating with a 
CSP. 
Transpower may offer its DR platform to other companies for their own purposes. 
2.5 Interruptible Load (IL) 
IL is incentive based DR. It is an ancillary service and one of two forms of Instantaneous 
Reserve (IR), the other form being Spinning Reserve (SR). IL is load available for shedding or 
demand reduction, whereas SR is additional generation capacity that can be made quickly 
available. IR of both forms enables the power system to respond to the tripping of the largest 
single supply asset, which is known as the risk setter, by supporting the grid system frequency 
to avoid cascade failure [17]. IR is further categorised into two classes based on time and 
duration of response: the first being Fast IR (FIR) which arrests frequency fall; and the second 
being Sustained IR (SIR) which restores frequency. IL that qualifies as FIR must be capable of 
being shed within 1 second of the grid system frequency falling to or below 49.2 Hz and be 
sustained for at least 60 seconds [18]. IL that qualifies as SIR must be shed over the first 60 
seconds of the grid system frequency falling to or below 49.2 Hz and be sustained until 
instructed by the SO [18]. IL is shed automatically using frequency controlled relays. Figure 3 
presents an example of IL shedding. The quantity of FIR required on hand is calculated by the 
SO’s Reserve Management Tool (RMT). The required quantities of IR are procured by the SO 
in an IR reserves market using the same procurement system as the wholesale energy market. 
IR, including IL, is offered and co-optimized by SPD with the energy market. A separate 
market exists for IR for each of the North and South Islands. The cost of procurement for the 
IR market is carried by the generators and the HVDC link owner (Transpower Ltd) who create 
the risk and the need for IR. Availability and event payments are charged. An event charge is 
paid by who is responsible for causing the under frequency event. The event charge is rebated 
to those who pay availability charges. On the demand side, IL is provided by industrial and 
commercial end-users. Usually these end-users will provide their IL via an aggregator who is 
contracted by the SO to offer IL into the reserves market. In return, the end-users receive 
payments for their IL.  
The cost of procuring IR in the reserves market was $66.2 million in 2009 and $21.9 million 
in 2010 [19]. Variation in this cost in recent years has been the result of factors such as energy 
market prices and the level of HVDC link transfers [17]. In comparison, the wholesale energy 
market traded $2.1 billion worth of energy in the year to July 2011 [3]. In monetary terms, the 
IR market therefore represents at most only about 3% of the energy market but it is essential 
for covering the security risk associated with the supply of energy.   




Figure 3 Example of IR activation: Step changes in capacity response is IL dropping off, 
gradual change is in response to spinning reserve changing output [Source: Electricity 
Authority]. 
2.5.1 EnerNOC’s Ancillary Services Programme 
EnerNOC Inc. is an aggregator of IL under its DemandSMART NZ Interruptible Load 
Programme [20]. In 2012 this offered over 120 MW of IL to the IR market in the North Island. 
It procures IL in both North and South Islands for Genesis Energy [21]. EnerNOC installs a 
data server at the client’s facility enabling real-time monitoring and viewing of energy data. 
Upon detecting a frequency drop EnerNOC metering automatically initiates shedding of 
nominated load which is notified to the client via SMS or Email. Clients receive monthly 
payments [22]. 
2.6 Scarcity Pricing 
This Electricity Authority wholesale market initiative came into force on 1 June 2013. It 
provides for the introduction of a $10,000/MWh price floor and $20,000/MWh price cap to the 
spot market when an electricity supply emergency throughout one or both islands causes forced 
power cuts i.e. emergency load shedding [23]. The initiative addresses the scenario whereby 
forced load shedding curtails demand whilst last resort generation is attempting to increase 
supply resulting in spot prices falling rather than rising.  
3. DR at the Retailer 
The general views of a selection of major retailers who have been interviewed are described in 
this section.  
3.1 Direct Load Control 
DR is used by retailers to manage load and therefore influence spot prices in an area, 
particularly if that area is constrained. A retailer may contract with distributors to use ripple 
control to provide load shifting services for peak periods. This can also include locational load 
shifting between GXPs. System agreements between a retailer and distributor may allow load 
controlling for the retailer’s purposes if the distributor is not requiring control for security of 
its own network. This control affects the customer loads of multiple retailers. The interests of 
these retailers are usually aligned by load controlling, the exception being a generator 
benefitting from a constraint. A more granular approach available is to load control through 
specific ripple channels. Ultimately, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) will allow a 
retailer to just control the load of its own customers.  
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3.2 Procurement of IL 
However, in general a greater priority is placed on the procurement of IL. The spot energy price 
is influenced by the availability of reserve since the two are co-optimized. Generation plant, or 
HVDC transmission, may be constrained back by a lack of reserve (the need albeit reduced 
with the commissioning of the second HVDC Pole 3). Thus the provision of IL can help 
mitigate high prices on a retailer’s load, as the spot energy price is influenced by the availability 
of reserve. Furthermore, from the perspective of a generator, sufficient reserve ensures dispatch 
enabling revenue from generation. The revenue which the retailer receives from the IL service 
itself is not a major consideration.  
For example, reserve in the receiving island can facilitate transfer on the HVDC link and 
thereby reduce prices.  This creates an incentive for generator-retailers (gen-tailers) to contract 
for IL.  It is conceivable that a generator may also purchase reserve in the South Island in order 
to manage southward HVDC power flows, and thereby manage their reservoirs more 
effectively.  This does depend on the generation mix of the generation company, so the focus 
on reserve and therefore IL may depend on the company.   
Overall however, markets such as the spot energy market, the hedging market (ASX), and the 
Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) used to manage basis risk (the change in price between 
locations where one buys and sells) are of far more value to gen-tailers. It might be argued that 
gen-tailers are not concerned about price because of their internal hedge as both generator and 
buyer, and because of hedging used by the rest.  However, price is in fact, a major concern to 
them. Even if their exposure is just 20% of the market, pricing going high (e.g. above 
$200/MWh) may be severely detrimental to them. Such a situation may arise where the high 
spot price is due to a constraint in an area in which the retailer is supplying customers, but 
where the gen-tailer is not itself generating. 
3.3 Curtailable Load 
Out of market curtailable load is being used to manage basis risk for a retailer. Curtailable 
industrial and commercial load in the lower North Island is being aggregated by EnerNOC, in 
this instance for Genesis Energy [24]. This aims to reduce wholesale electricity price spikes in 
the lower North Island. When the need arises, Genesis informs EnerNOC that DR capacity is 
required. In turn EnerNOC contacts their clients to reduce consumption or switch to back-up 
generation. The notice time is two hours and clients have the choice to opt out in a manner 
similar to Transpower’s price responsive DR. EnerNOC installs meters that communicate to 
its Network Operations Centre. Clients then have real time energy monitoring via EnerNOC’s 
DemandSMART web based portal. Notification to clients is via SMS, Email, or phone. Clients 
receive a capacity payment for being enrolled and an energy payment based on the amount of 
DR delivered. 
Retailers may also directly contract embedded generators to mitigate high spot prices during a   
transmission constraint. 
3.4 Tariff based DR 
This is price based DR and it requires the roll-out of AMI or smart meters to consumers. In 
[12] it is noted that New Zealand still lags the US in the introduction of price based DR, and 
that significant investments are required in communications, smart-meters, and smart 
appliances before a significant impact can be made. A retailer who has introduced smart-meters 
and Time of Use (TOU) tariffs to domestic consumers comments that their roll-out process is 
slow but on-going.   
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3.5 DD and DSBF 
One retailer views the forthcoming introduction of DD with some appeal. In contrast, it views 
DSBF as having very little appeal; it seems difficult to imagine a situation where sustained DR 
is provided voluntarily by DSBF when the prices are high for a sustained period of months at 
a time.  DSBF can adjust bids, so it will probably adjust them up, thereby making it only useful 
for brief periods if at all. The voluntary nature of DSBF also makes it unreliable. 
Another retailer notes that a DD participant is required to be a purchaser as defined by the 
Code, and that except for very large users, compliance issues will require the need for an 
aggregator. Regarding DSBF, this retailer argues that as consumers do not respond in the 
wholesale market timeframe, and as larger users use hedging, that there is insufficient response 
for DSBF. However, the retailer suggests that sufficient smart-metering signalling spot pricing 
may enable enough response.   
4. DR at the Distribution Level 
Ripple control to shed household hot water heating load has been used for many decades in 
New Zealand [25] [26] to very successfully improve the utilisation of generation, transmission, 
and distribution assets. It is a form of incentive based DR known as Direct Load Control (DLC) 
[2]. Today it remains the principal DR tool used by distributors. Transpower charges 
distribution companies for the use of the national grid by including a Regional Coincident Peak 
Demand (RCPD) charge [27]. There are two regions in each island.  Both upper island regions 
(UNI and USI) price on the 12 RCPD peaks in the measurement period, while the two lower 
island regions price on the top 100 RCPD peaks.   A distribution company responds by using 
ripple control to minimize their portion of their region’s charge. In this Section, more unusual 
or innovative forms of DR implemented by several distribution companies are out-lined 
beginning with an overview of Orion’s DR.  
4.1 Orion 
Orion uses DR for the purposes of deferring capital expenditure, and maintaining compliance 
with their security of supply standard. The use of DR was an important tool in managing the 
restoration of supply during the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Metering owners have 
installed approximately 110,000 smart meters, most of which contain inbuilt ripple receivers 
on the Orion network.  Where appropriate, the remainder of the 190,000 network connections 
have standalone ripple receivers.    
The use of ripple control allows a 5-10% reduction of peak demand corresponding to 30-60 
MW. Customers with loads exceeding 300 kVA are subject to peak demand period pricing. 
This enables a further 3% of peak demand reduction. Furthermore, it is estimated that the use 
of day-night pricing options has encouraged approximately 10% of load to be shifted from the 
daytime peak into the overnight trough3.  Thus peak demand has been reduced by a total of 
approximately 20% and this is responsible for a large part of the divergence between energy 
and peak demand shown in Figure 4. 
                                                     
3 Approximately 50,000 connections are on day/night and a further 10,000 or so on separate 
night rates.  The transfer of load to the night is so successful that the signalling of night load 
switching is staggered to manage potential night time peaks. 
 





Figure 4 Historical growth of Orion network’s peak demand. Black line: measured system 
peak demand. Red line: system peak demand if it had grown at the same rate as demand in 
energy [Source: Orion NZ Ltd]. 
Figure 5 shows how ripple control reduces peak demand in the USI region on a winter day by 
levelling out peaks to fill adjacent troughs. At a regional level Orion has achieved all the load 
shifting that is practical short of using other storage means to shift day-time consumption into 
the night.  
 
Figure 5 An example of ripple control to contain the USI’s Winter day peak demand [Source: 
Orion NZ Ltd]. 
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Orion has led the implementation of the USI Load Manager, starting with the 2009-2011 trial 
[28] which began co-ordinating the ripple loads of eight distribution companies. Out of 1000 
MW of USI load, there is 70 to 100 MW of manageable load. This regional DR load managing 
initiative also provides Transpower with greater visibility via the USI Load Manager of the 
state of the USI demand side response and enables transmission investment deferral.   
Orion has established a load curtailment scheme to better manage a peculiar combination of 
two characteristics of its rural network: the first being long distribution lines having low inter-
connectivity; and the second being large water-pump loads being feed from these lines during 
the irrigation season. The scheme provides irrigators with the option of being contracted to be 
the first to be cut-off in an emergency, thereby allowing better security of supply for more 
critical loads such as dairy sheds in an affected area. This DR scheme uses ripple control to 
operate only irrigator relays. Irrigators are incentivised to participate with an interruptibility 
rebate [29]. The scheme has enabled substantial deferral of rural network investment in lines 
and contingency assets.   
4.2 The Lines Company (TLC) 
In response to having a network characterized by low demand and connection densities having 
many remote rural connections, combined with a high proportion of customers with low annual 
energy consumption, TLC has moved to charging for capacity [30]. An energy based charging 
methodology was deemed unsuitable. Instead, TLC has introduced a charging component 
based on the uncontrolled kW load of a customer during periods of load controlling. To better 
facilitate this approach, TLC is gradually rolling out its own advanced metering. For customers 
with this metering, the six highest two hour peaks in the measurement period when TLC is load 
controlling are averaged to determine a base variable capacity and associated charge. TLC have 
also introduced direct billing of line charges to consumers, and considers this approach more 
effective than using traditional retailer channels. The resulting separation of billing of line 
charges and of retailer energy charges should provide greater transparency of electricity pricing 
for consumers. TLC has an ageing network. The DR resulting from capacity pricing should 
also allow TLC to focus on renewing ageing assets to enhance security rather than having to 
use resources to increase network capacity.      
4.3 Vector 
Vector has launched an initiative offering installation of Photo-Voltaic (PV) panels combined 
with battery storage for domestic customers [31]. The installation includes a 12.3 kWh Lithium 
ion battery pack, inverter, and control unit with a choice of 3, 4, or 5 kW capacity PV panels. 
In [32] the potential problems of increasing PV only penetration into the network are described 
such as over/under-voltage and un-intended islanding. The addition of battery storage mitigates 
these issues. Further, the addition of battery storage enhances the benefits of PV which include: 
supply security, power quality management, mitigating the potential charging impact of electric 
vehicles on the network, and operation as a peak power supply. Distributed battery storage 
allows batteries to be charged at night, and then be used by the distributor to load shift power 
back into the network at peak times. Figure 6 provides a simulated example of how the addition 
of storage to PV allows peak demand from a network to be curtailed in the evening when PV 
supply is unavailable. 




Figure 6 Simulated load profile of an urban LV network during normal operation, with 10% 
PV penetration and with PV and storage [32]. 
5. DR for Domestic Consumers 
Historically, DR operating in the NZ home has been limited to distributor’s ripple control of 
hot-water and the homeowner’s manual response to the retailer’s traditional tariffs such as 
day/night rates. However this is slowly beginning to become more sophisticated following the 
introduction of Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) in the US since 2008-2009. 
HEMS is defined by [33] as any product or service that monitors, controls, or analyzes energy 
in the home. This definition not only includes smart-meters, but also residential utility DR 
programs, home automation services, data analysis and visualization, auditing, and related 
security services. HEMS solutions can be classified as utility based or non-utility based. In the 
US, utility solutions typically involve a single-load-per-home DR program or an energy 
efficiency initiative. DR systems’ costs are in the low-to-mid hundreds of dollars range, and 
baseload reduction/energy efficiency programs save 2 percent to 20 percent. Utilities typically 
do a one-time hardware purchase with an annual subscription service for energy management 
and integration services provided by the vendor. The utility benefits greatly from these services, 
and usually also has to pay for the entire solution. Comparatively, NZ’s use of ripple control is 
already wide-spread and provides a substantial benefit. 
Non-utility solutions in the US focus solely on the home customer and integrate various smart-
home services, which fall under the broad definition of HEMS proposed above. The detailed 
economic analysis used for utility customers is replaced with a smart marketing campaign 
targeting the needs of homeowners. Vendors often enter the home with a security solution and 
then offer HEMS as an add-on sale. Homeowners can purchase the HEMS hardware in the 
mid-hundreds to low-thousands range, and pay between $15 and $60 per month for energy 
management, automation and security services. Between $5 and $15 of this monthly bill can 
be attributed to energy management services. This business model can effectively double 
telecom company revenue for a home and is easy to scale to millions of existing customers. 
Overlapping solutions consist mainly of smart thermostats. The US HEMS sector is described 
by [33] as being no longer about complex hardware solutions focused solely on maximizing 
energy reduction in the home while ignoring occupant comfort. Instead, utilities, customers 
and third-party vendors look to find the right balance between energy reduction, cost and 
customer satisfaction. 
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In [34], the technical components of a HEMS system are listed as comprising of sensing 
devices, measuring devices, smart appliances, enabling ICT, and energy management systems. 
Challenges to implementation are summarized as cost, lack of standards, low consumer 
awareness or interest, choice of ICT, and degree of system intelligence. In [35] HEMS is 
investigated in detail, and in [36] ICT systems for the smart-grid and home are examined. The 
difficulty in vendors successfully launching HEMS is highlighted by giants Google, Microsoft, 
and Cisco all withdrawing certain energy management products in recent years [34].  
With reference to Section 4, some examples of HEMS being employed in NZ include TLC’s 
tools for peak load management and Vector’s PV and battery system including the control unit 
and an online dashboard. TLC offers a power viewing device and a smart-switch which 
automatically turns off appliances connected to it during load controlling [37].   
6. Discussion and Further Directions for DR 
The aim of DSBF described in Section 2.2 is to improve the inputs into the price forecast 
schedules in order to improve the accuracy of the schedules themselves. The resulting benefit 
of more accurate schedules is better use and planning of generation and DR capability. It is 
suggested that the schedules could be made more efficient by the following actions: first, by 
applying better methodology to further improve the accuracy of the load forecasts; secondly 
by improving the accuracy of non-conforming load bids, and thirdly by reducing the gate 
closure time to less than two hours. Currently, bids and offers may only be revised up to two 
hours in advance of their trading period unless there are exceptional circumstances [38]. 
Reducing the closure time may require more rapid SPD processing. 
The system frequency continuously fluctuates in response to changing demand and the 
impossibility of generation being able to instantaneously track that demand. Frequency keeping 
generators are contracted in the ancillary services market to maintain system frequency 
fluctuation to within a normal band [39]. With increasing penetration of intermittent renewable 
generation in NZ such as wind, in order to maintain balancing, the amount and cost of 
frequency keeping may increase in the future. A possible alternative to more backup generation 
is a demand side solution known as Dynamic Demand Control (DDC). This involves using 
frequency responsive loads which may be industrial, commercial, or domestic. Suitable loads 
include refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners, and heating systems. A simulation applying 
DDC using domestic refrigerator loads in the UK suggested technical and economic benefits 
[40].        
The wholesale market is currently reliant on dispatchable generators competing amongst 
themselves, without dispatchable demand side bidders. DD changes that, and presents the 
potential to aggregate load suitable for DD (from the same GXP) at a single DCLS. This could 
reduce compliance cost encouraging DD participation beyond large users. There is also the 
potential for an aggregator to use a platform for DD such as Transpower’s DRMS. 
7. Conclusions 
Many forms of DR, both incentive and price based, have been identified operating at all levels 
of the electricity complex in NZ from the SO through to the domestic consumer. These realise 
the benefits of DR including deferred asset investment, reduced environmental impact, 
improved security of supply, and better integration of variable renewable generation. Further 
forms of DR and their associated systems will be adopted as smart-grid and smart-technologies 
develop, altogether forming a rapidly emerging fabric of DR systems in NZ. 
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